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Abstract- There is a need to balance the reliance on a traditional OSHMS being implicitly adhered to against 
the human contribution factor. The aim of this qualitative study paper is to describe and discuss the existing 
leadership styles and approaches that are being practiced and past initiatives that have produced results in 
OSH performance. The snowball sampling review method of literature published between years 1997 through 
2016 was applied to produce the observations and discussion. Despite the progress that is being realized, 
there needs to be a different approach if a sustainable performance breakthrough in OSH performance is to 
be achieved. The integral approach leans towards transformational leadership style and attempts to 
acknowledge that the subjective and objective, personal and collective factors are all equally important 
towards establishing wholesome and robust OSHMS. Traditional reliance on discipline and rule-based 
compliance needs to be tempered with an interdependent realization and awareness from the individual 
carrying out a task that they are ultimately responsible for their safety.  Leadership and management will 
then need to take on the role and challenge of providing support and resources to enable the development of 
this self-accountable culture.    
 
Index Terms: Integral approach, subjective side of safety, safety culture, OSHMS evolution. 
 
                                                                     
 
 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
This paper asserts that there needs to exist a balance between the subjective and objective 
views towards occupational safety practices and approaches at the workplace. The transformational 
safety leadership-consulting firm of JMJ Associates (2009) advocates that safety culture evolves from 
a dependent stage to an independent stage then proceeds onwards to an interdependent stage. This 
concept is not isolated from Hudson’s (2007) development model that suggests safety evolution 
occurring through three waves, which are the technical wave, the system wave and the cultural wave. 
Glendon et al.[1] offer a different school of thought where it is suggested that the each period 
of development does not leave behind the preceding period, but rather it builds on what has been 
achieved before. This developmental stage is referred to as the fourth stage of safety or the 
‘integration age’. In this stage, the previous thoughts and leanings are not lost but are integrated and 
remain available to be reflected upon as the individual perspectives as well as the organizational 
dynamics continue to evolve. 
Without discounting Glendon et al. (2006) suggestion on the integration age, it would be 
appropriate to introduce the next, or the fifth level of evolution, which could be termed as the ‘integral 
age’. The integral age encompasses the past stages of development and integrates them into future 
plans and actions without discounting the past learning. It is not merely an accumulation of learning 
but an efficiency-thoroughness trade off (ETTO). It is also resilience engineering as described by 
Holnagell [2]. This is essentially moving away from the contemporary view and traditional 
application of occupational safety and health management system (OSHMS) being the end-all guiding 
document providing answers to safety rules and safety development.  
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II. THE HUMAN INTERFACE IN OSHMS 
 
There is an increasing body of literature that point towards the fallacy of over reliance on, and 
in many cases, the sole reliance of a documented OSHMS in addressing risk management. Robson et 
al. [3] carried out an extensive review of health and safety management system and concluded, “there 
is insufficient evidence in the published, peer-reviewed literature on the effectiveness of OSHMS to 
make recommendations either in favor of or against OSHMSs”. This is similar to the view detailed in 
the 1999 Report of the Longford Royal Commission into the explosion at the Esso Longford gas plant 
in Victoria.  Among the findings of the investigation team was that although Esso had a world-class 
OSHMS, in reality the system had mutated into something that it was not designed for. It was 
“divorced from operations in the field” and thus “diverting attention away from what was actually 
happening in the practical functioning of the plants in Longford” [4]. 
The Gretly Mine disaster which occurred in 1996 and as analyzed by Hopkins [5] shared the 
same observation that “experience is now teaching us that safety management systems are not enough 
to ensure safety”. In support of this view, the New South Wales Mines Advisory Council advocates in 
a report commissioned in 2007 that the OSHMS should be developed based on a principle of 
mindfulness and not be one that is “complex, paper-based OSH management system”. 
Reason [6] holds a view that managers view culture as being separate from OSHMS. This is 
based on the observation that an over reliance of OSHMS while having an underdeveloped 
appreciation and understanding of the workplace culture can cause failure, because “it is the 
workplace culture that ultimately determines the success or failure of such systems”. 
Hopkins [7] argues that safety culture has become a major focus towards improving OSH 
performance mainly stemming from the realization that there are limitations to OSHMS. The dangers 
of having culture of silos, culture of rules and culture of on-time running  along with a risk-denying or 
risk-blind were some of the cultural aspects highlighted by Hopkins in his interpretation of the 1999 
Glenbrook train crash between a commuter train and the Indian Pacific. These are issues that are not 
addressed by traditional OSHMS’s and are often only clearly visible or noted after an incident has 
occurred or in hindsight. 
Hopkins (2007) also believes that safety culture is only one element of an organizational 
culture, or rather the one element that focuses on safety. Therefore, to adjust and adapt the safety 
culture will require the adaptation of the collective group and not only of individuals. Efforts to 
change culture will need the focus of changing collective practices (practices of both the managers 
and workers).  This view is heavily based on Reason’s [8] work that promotes a safe culture being an 
informed culture supported with Weick and Suttcliffe’s (2001;2007) elaboration on collective 
mindfulness. 
The argument from Reason (1997) is that engineering or creating a safety culture can be done 
and that a safe culture is an informed culture.  His argument is that in addressing the situation of 
facing risk and what is the acceptable risk threshold, organizations need to aim for maximum 
resistance to risk. This aim for maximum resistance to risk needs to be clearly distinguished between 
the now clichéd ‘zero risk’ slogan being touted excessively. 
Towards establishing a balance between the operational practicalities of managing safety 
based on an OSHMS while developing an integral approach towards leadership in general, JMJ 
Associates (2009) have suggested the application of a conceptual mental-model adapted from the 
work of Wilber (2000). Within this conceptual integral approach model, the organization is viewed 
holistically from 4 quadrants described as interior (subjective) and exterior (objective) point of view 
by individuals and groups.  
JMJ Associates (2009) adopts a view based on the model propounded by Wilber (2000) that a 
fundamental approach to creating safety performance breakthrough is to explore both the subjective 
and objective, personal and collective factors, which influence choice and behavior. This is based on 
the premise that collective individuals make up an organization, thus creating a group. From a meta-
system point of view, these collective factors can be translated as, a) The unique way that an 
individual views the situation. For example: “I believe that management cares for my safety”; b) The 
way a group views the situation- the collective understanding, beliefs and commitments.  For example: 
“We are committed to being the industry leader in safety performance”; c) The view of something 
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(including a person or behavior from the outside. For example: “He should have used his gloves for 
that task.” and d) The view of group of things from the outside. For example: “I see that they carry 
out housekeeping after each task is completed”. 
A point to note is that the initial two points- namely (a) and (b) as described above is not 
visible from the outside or it does not manifest itself to an observer. These are referred to as the 
subjective view or internal perspective. The latter two points of view on the other hand infer the view 
of perspective that can be observed or seen from the outside. These are referred to as the objective 
view or external perspective (JMJ Associates, 2009). When viewed as a whole, the integral approach 
can be depicted as the four-quadrant map that informs or provides insight to supplement the reliability 
and efficiency of an existing OSHMS. 
 
 Figure 1. The integral perspective (as developed by JMJ Associates and adapted from Ken 
Wilber’s Four Quadrant model) 
 
Based on the adaptive leadership concept developed by Heifetz (1994), JMJ Associates (2009) 
further asserts that by insisting on the validity of all perspective presented in the integral approach and 
their dynamic interrelationship, this four-quadrant map allows for a robust and compounded 
understanding of safety performance.  This understanding in turn ensures that the critical, if not all, 
factors related to a task or assignment are considered prior to any action being planned or undertaken. 
Danner [9] at the 2012 National Safety Council Congress and Expo elaborated on 
organizational safety culture being the manifestation of mindset, belief and values. This culture can be 
measured in part by applying the DuPont Bradley Curve to demonstrate the progressive maturity of 
the organizations culture (DuPont, 2012). The reactive, dependent, independent and interdependent 
phases are similar in concept to the reacting, conforming, achieving and integral phases applied by 
JMJ Associates (2009) in their safety consulting practice. 
DuPont’s (2012) view on the four phases is as follows,  
(i) Reactive: In this phase, safety is led by natural instincts; changes often are not made 
until incidents occur and senior leadership or management are not closely involved in 
the process.  
(ii) (ii) Dependent: This phase has management commitment, rules and procedures, and 
employees are held accountable and receive safety training and discipline, but it is a 
command and control type of culture.  
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(iii) Independent: Workers in this phase value safety as individuals. They think about 
their safety in regards to whatever they are doing individually. Individuals in this 
phase care for themselves and their own safety and feel personal value.  
(iv) Interdependent: Workers in this final phase go beyond caring about their own safety 
and instead feel invested in others’ safety, as well. There is no hierarchy when it 
comes to safety because everyone is concerned about it. For example, a janitor might 
point out a safety oversight or provide input on a safety related performance 
enhancement process to an operations manager, and the manager will not feel 
slighted, but rather, the manager would be grateful that this employee is invested in 
safety over and above the job-scope boundary. This is a caring and concerned 
teamwork-centered environment that goes beyond behavior-based safety culture that 
may merely be paper-based safety at times. 
III. MOVING AWAY FROM BLIND OSHMS COMPLIANCE AND MOVING 
TOWARDS AN INTERDEPENDENT MINDSET. 
 
Conventional thinking based on experience dictates that safety rules written for the benefit of 
the workforce safety can be scripted with enough details and thus will serve to meet legal and other 
industry code requirements. There are now emerging views that more rules does not necessarily 
equate to better safety results, and these views are backed with findings and statistical data. Reason 
(1997) noted that there are times when writing more rules can contradict the action required to 
complete the task. Hopkins (2005) promotes the act of complementing safety rules with a risk 
assessment process that invites the workers to not only comply with rules in a mindless fashion, but to 
also understand the intricacies of why the control measures are in place. 
Hale et al. (2003), Jeffcott et al. (2006) and Deker (2003) stressed the need for organizations 
to understand the gap between procedure and practice instead of simply increasing pressure to comply. 
This would contribute towards developing operator’s skill at adapting his responses in any given 
unusual situation or any departure from the normal standard operating procedures. . 
Dekker (2003) goes on to propose the following for organizations to pay attention to: 
a) Monitor the gap between procedure and practice and try to understand why it exist (and 
resist trying to close it by simply telling people to comply). 
b) Help people to develop the skill to judge when & how to adapt (and resist telling people they 
should follow procedures) 
The description above is summarized by the term “Collective Mindfulness,” that variability in 
human performance can enhance safety mindfulness while unvarying performance can undermine 
safety, particularly in a complex socio-technical systems. 
Hopkins (2007) in his analysis of the Gretley mine disaster and Hopkins (2001) Esso Longford 
gas plant in Victoria was critical of managers not being mindful and points out the need for leaders to 
be mindful as a prerequisite to avoid disaster. In a further analysis of the BP (British Petroleum) 
Texas City explosion, Hopkins [10] reviewed how BP had set their sights on being a High Reliability 
Organization (HRO) insomuch as to display characteristics of collective mindfulness. This attempt 
was not entirely successful as the focus was mainly on training the front line workers, but without 
much attention paid to the organizational elements that needed to be present in an organization to 
support the development of collective mindfulness. 
Learning from failures contrasted against celebrating success, as well as strong response to weak 
signals are among the traits of HRO as described by Weick et.al (1999). HRO’s are described to be 
‘complex, adaptive systems by Weick et.al (1999) because they are ‘preoccupied with failure’ and 
treat any lapse as ‘something wrong with the system’; that they are ‘reluctant to simplify’ and attempt 
to simplify less and see more. They are also ‘sensitive to operations’ and promote situation awareness 
for crewmembers at the sharp end. They have ‘a commitment to resilience’ and refuse to allow errors 
to disable them. 
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Reason (2008) has argued that towards “maintaining a state of intelligent wariness”, then both 
individual mindfulness and collective mindfulness is necessary. This view represents a view that is 
moving away from the view that collective mindfulness takes precedence over individual mindfulness 
as propounded by Weick and Hopkins. Reason (2008) holds the view that individual mindfulness is 
paramount by asking the following question: “If we cannot make systems immune to organizational 
accidents, what can we do to improve the reliability and wisdom of those at the sharp end?” 
The sharp end in this context refers to a person who is directly interacting with the hazard at a 
given time under a given context. Essentially, these people are the last line of defense between safe 
execution and unsafe incident outcome.  Giving these people (people at the sharp end) the knowledge 
and skills of recognizing when to adapt is good for safety performance when it could be life-
threatening. 
 
IV. CONCLUSION 
 
The value of having a robust OSHMS is undeniable, and has been proven to be the foundation 
of many HRO, yielding incremental improvements in safety performance.  Along with this 
acknowledgement of success, and as surfaced by this paper, there is a realization that strictly relying 
on safety rules to control or manipulate behaviors has it evident limitations. The more mature and 
high-risk workforce are now slowly but steadily morphing towards the integral approach to safety. 
This is an age where the previous phases of being reactive, conforming and achieving are transcended 
by an integral phase.  This essentially means that there are no cultural-progression-developmental 
elements that are replaced or removed, but rather, the future managers and leaders are working within 
the previous phase’s boundaries and building on them with the ultimate aim of future improvements. 
©2008 JMJ Associates, LLP.  All rights reserved. ®™ Mark of JMJ Associates, LLP.
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Figure: 2. The Stages of Safety Evolution. Adapted from: JMJ Associates (1997) 
 
The integral approach to safety acknowledges that there exists socially constructed sub-
culture within a traditional OSHMS within an organization. Within this realization is imbedded the 
adaptive culture and resilience engineering, and to understand and begin to use this technology, 
human variability needs to be acknowledged an accepted as an asset important for safety.  
It is also the starting point towards analyzing what specific actions that can be initiated, or 
should be stopped towards establishing a proactive safety culture. It is envisioned that these specific 
actions will be the potential focus areas for the authors’ future research activities. 
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